Chapter three focuses on the progression of tolerance for seditious speech---speech criticizing the government---through the last century, gradually moving toward a liberal interpretation of the First Amendment, for example, the progression from the bad-tendency doctrine to the clear-and-present-danger doctrine and finally to incitement. To illustrate how disgustingly paranoid the government used to be of seditious speech, the chapter discusses how one citizen during WWI was convicted for writing in a personal letter that "I am for the people and the government is for profiteers." (p. 45) Thankfully, our standards for tolerance have grown since WWI, or at least, the government must have a pretty good reason to limit free speech.
Seditious speech is a variation of political speech, which as we've discussed, political speech is highly protected and valued compared to other types of speech. With this in mind, I have to agree with this liberal interpretation of First Amendment protections for seditious speech. While I see how Criminal Syndicalism laws are justifiable in that the government may be protecting both public and state interests, they pose conflicts of interest when weighed against our notion of Freedom of Speech (some more than others). We operate under a marketplace of ideas in which, by debating, the best ideas can rise to the top. A marketplace of ideas is difficult to operate when we limit speech, and so, by allowing ideas room to breathe, they can contribute to an inclusive society. As a nation that aspires to be self-governed, it's imperative we have political information to govern ourselves. If we place too much power in the government, then the people are at risk of having too little power themselves. This chapter reminds me of a quote by Justice Brandeis, who recognizes "the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities." Brandeis asserts in his concurring opinion during New York Times v. Sullivan:
"Thus, we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." 376 U.S. 254, 39 (1964).
Here, SCOTUS determined that the publication of all statements, even false ones, about the conduct of public officials except when statements are made with actual malice are constitutionally protected. Brandeis' statement goes back to the notion that we the people are equipped with Freedom of Speech to keep the government in check by taking on a sort of "watchdog" role. On the other hand, there's certainly an interest in maintaining stability, and I absolutely agree there's a limit to how much freedom we can provide more radical seditious speech, especially speech that violates both public health/state interest. There are simply some contexts where the government should logically issue prior restraint, such as a person sharing to the public---for example---instructions on "how to build nuclear weaponry," which clearly cannot be given a public platform as it's seditious speech that violates public interest and state interest by "preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action." 395 U.S. 444, 492 (1969)
Sources:
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 492 (1969) Retrieved from: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/395/444
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 39 (1964) Retrieved from: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/376/254
Tedford, Thomas L., and Dale A. Herbeck. Freedom of Speech in the United States. 8th ed., Strata Publishing, Inc., 2017.
Seditious speech is a variation of political speech, which as we've discussed, political speech is highly protected and valued compared to other types of speech. With this in mind, I have to agree with this liberal interpretation of First Amendment protections for seditious speech. While I see how Criminal Syndicalism laws are justifiable in that the government may be protecting both public and state interests, they pose conflicts of interest when weighed against our notion of Freedom of Speech (some more than others). We operate under a marketplace of ideas in which, by debating, the best ideas can rise to the top. A marketplace of ideas is difficult to operate when we limit speech, and so, by allowing ideas room to breathe, they can contribute to an inclusive society. As a nation that aspires to be self-governed, it's imperative we have political information to govern ourselves. If we place too much power in the government, then the people are at risk of having too little power themselves. This chapter reminds me of a quote by Justice Brandeis, who recognizes "the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities." Brandeis asserts in his concurring opinion during New York Times v. Sullivan:
"Thus, we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." 376 U.S. 254, 39 (1964).
Here, SCOTUS determined that the publication of all statements, even false ones, about the conduct of public officials except when statements are made with actual malice are constitutionally protected. Brandeis' statement goes back to the notion that we the people are equipped with Freedom of Speech to keep the government in check by taking on a sort of "watchdog" role. On the other hand, there's certainly an interest in maintaining stability, and I absolutely agree there's a limit to how much freedom we can provide more radical seditious speech, especially speech that violates both public health/state interest. There are simply some contexts where the government should logically issue prior restraint, such as a person sharing to the public---for example---instructions on "how to build nuclear weaponry," which clearly cannot be given a public platform as it's seditious speech that violates public interest and state interest by "preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action." 395 U.S. 444, 492 (1969)
Sources:
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 492 (1969) Retrieved from: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/395/444
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 39 (1964) Retrieved from: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/376/254
Tedford, Thomas L., and Dale A. Herbeck. Freedom of Speech in the United States. 8th ed., Strata Publishing, Inc., 2017.
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